This requirement for identity and individuation criteria for each category is a general one in metaphysicsapplying equally to other categories such as sets, objects and personsbut it is one which has proved problematic in the case of properties because it is a difficult requirement for the property theorist to satisfy. Since such epistemic worries do not directly challenge the existence of properties unless one has a fairly strict requirement that the entities of our ontology be epistemically accessible to us, it remains open to the property theorist to advocate a kind of Kantian humility about whether the properties which we think exist are the ones which there really are (Lewis 2009). Moreover, if instantiation is itself a relation, its existence may lead to an infinite regress (see Section 4a). Four Disputes about Properties. Spatio-temporal properties and properties of abstract objects (if there are any) are particularly problematic in this regard. Some philosophers, with an exceptionally relaxed view of kinds (or a minimalist view of properties), argue that kinds and properties coincide: that is, that somethings being of a certain kind K simply involves the instantiation of a property and vice versa. Unnatural science. Please enable it to take advantage of the complete set of features! Borghini, A. and Williams, N. E. 2008. Armstrong, D. M. 1992. Despite these difficulties in the formulation of a pan-dispositionalist ontology, it is thought by its supporters to have significant explanatory advantages over its rival which treats properties as categorical. (This example is employed for simplicity, but as noted above in Section 6, species are not really good examples of this distinction, since it is not obvious that there are properties which are essential to being a certain species.) Alternatively, the property theorist might challenge the claim that the instantiation regress is vicious (Orilia 2006). Some of these options will be discussed below, but for now it is enough to note that the interconnections between these issues make it difficult to give a unique and plausible account of property identity in the abstract. If relation R genuinely relates objects b and c, then R must be something to b and c. However, if R is something to b and c, then there must be a relation R which captures the relation between R and b and c. However, if R genuinely relates R, b and c, then there must be another relation R which relates R to R, b and c; which in turns requires the existence of another relation R, and so on. Modality, Sparsity, and Essence. PHIL 6014 (crn: 20919): Spring 2023 Philosophy of Inductive-Statistical Inference (This is an IN-PERSON class*)Wed 4:00-6:30 pm, McBryde 223(Office hours: Tuesdays 3-4; Wednesdays 1:30-2:30) Syllabus: Second Installment (PDF) D. Mayo (2018) Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars (SIST)
